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A determination of the constitutional validity of House Resolution
No. 84 creating the Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee,
which could come about if plaintiffs are successful in their appeal to
the Circuit Court of Appeals,33 would involve a close scrutiny of the
wording of that Resolution. There would be at least some precedent
for a determination that this Resolution is unconstitutionally over-
broad and vague. Specifically, the power given KUAC to investigate
any activity in Kentucky which the committee deems "subversive" is
as broad and sweeping as the power of any committee could be. The
threat of State criminal contempt convictions for those who refuse to
cooperate with the Committee adds emphasis to this broad power.
Such a committee with power to brand an individual as a "subversive"
by simply calling him before the committee in a public hearing could
easily stifle free speech and association, especially among those whose
ideas may not agree with the current majority of thinking. The
Supreme Court has given a special place to rights protected by the
first amendment. As the Court stated in NAACP v. Button,3 4 "These
(first amendment) freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society .... The threat of sanctions may
deter their exercise as potently as the actual application of sanctions."
It is the threat of sanctions which plaintiffs in Braden allege infringe
on their first amendment freedoms.
I. Dan Kemp
DoxiZEsc RELATIONs-FRAuDuLENT REPRESENTATON OF PREGNANCY
As GRoUNDs FOR ANNULmENT-For almost a year prior to their marriage
the husband and wife had frequently engaged in sexual intercourse.
3 3 An appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs asking that the district court
be reversed and a three-judge panel be convened for determination of the case
on its merits. Braden v. Nunn, appeal docketed, No. 18849, (6th Cir. July 24,
1968).
A complementary suit was filed in Federal District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky in July, 1968, after KUAC members had been appointed
and the committee had drawn up its rules of procedure. The allegations made
in this suit were essentially the came as in Braden v. Nunn except for the fact
that the committee had become operative and functioning when the second suit
was filed. A three-judge panel was convened to bear this case although no oral
hearing was held because attorneys were not notified of the hearing. The three-
judge court held that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim for which
relief could be granted and dismissed the suit. Black Unity League v. Miller,
Civil No. 5980 (W.D. Ky., Sept. 4, 1968), appeal filed, U.S. , Nov.
4, 1968. This case has also been appealed and is pending. Plaintiff's attorneys are
also appealing for "emergency relief" in that they were not notified of the con-
vening of the three-judge panel and were not given an opportunity to make
oral arguments.
34 371 U.S. 415, 533 (1963).
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The husband was induced to marry the wife by her assertion that she
was pregnant and by her threat to have him expelled from college as
well as to bring punitive civil and criminal action if he did not marry
her. One week after the marriage, upon discovering that his wife was
not pregnant and upon her admission that she had never had any
reasonable cause to believe that she had been pregnant, the husband
left her1 and sought an annulment for fraud.2 The Circuit Court denied
relief and the husband appealed. Held: Reversed. Where the husband
is induced to marry by an intentional false representation of pregnancy,
there is sufficient fraud to grant an annulment. Parks v. Parks, 418
S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1967).
While it is generally recognized that a marriage induced by fraud
is voidable3 and subject to annulment,4 a marriage induced by a
fraudulent claim of pregnancy is not grounds for annulment in most
states.5 In the United States the earliest decisions granting annulments
for fraud were based on contract law and the theory that marriage
1 As the plaintiff left the defendant immediately upon learning of the fraud,
the defense of ratification was not raised. For a general discussion of the subject
of ratification in relation to annulment of marriage, see Moore, Defenses Available
in Annulment Actions, 7 J. Fm. L. 275 (1967).2 KRS § 402.030 authorizes courts having general equity jurisdiction to
"declare void any marriage obtained by ... fraud....
aVoidable as opposed to void means, among other things, that: 1) the
voidable marriage is only subject to direct attack to annul during the lives ofte parties; 2) that a judicial annulment is required, and the mere election of the
injured person to treat the marriage as void is not sufficient; 3) the injured person
must break off marital relations immediately upon discovering the fraud or he
will be deemed to have ratified the voidable marriage. See Kingsley, Fraud as aGround for Annulment of a Marriage, 18 So. CAL. L. Ruv. 213, 285-37 (1945).4The statutes of thirteen states declare that a marriage induced by fraud is
voidable. ArAsKA STAT. § 25.05.031 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-106 (1947);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-103 (1961); IND. STAT. ANN. § 44-106 (1965); MmIN. STAT.ANN. § 518.02 (1947); MISS. CODE ArNi. § 2748-02 (1957); NEB. Rzv. STAT. §42-118 (1957); Nzv. REv. STAT. § 125.340 (1963); N.Y. DOM. RE. LAw § 7(1964); OnE. REv. STAT. § 106.030 (1965); VT. STAT. tit. 15. § 512 (1947);
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.04.130 (1967); and Wyo. STAT. § 20-33 (1959).
Two state statutes declare such marriages void. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-103
and 53-104 (1961), and MicH. STAT. ANN. § 25.82 (1957).
The statutes of eleven states provide for the annulment of marriages inducedby fraud, but they do not state whether they are void or voidable. CAL. Crv.
CODE § 82 (1966); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13. § 1551 (1953); HAWAII REv. LAws
tit. 33, § 324-1 (1957); IDAHO CODE § 32-501 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §60-1602 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. § 402.030 (1962); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN.§ 48-202 (1961); N.D. CENT. CoDEs § 14-04-01 (1960); Omo REV. CODE ANN.§ 3105.31 (1967); S. D. CODE § 14.0601 (1939); and Wis. STAT. § 247.02 (1955).5 Mobley v. Moblev. 245 Ala. 90. 16 So. 2d 5 (1943); Mason v. Mason, 164
Ark. 59. 261 S.W. 40 (1924); Gondouin v. Goudouin, 14 Cal. App. 285, 111 P.756 (1910); Brandt v. Brandt, 123 Fla. 680, 167 So. 524 (1936); Levy v. Levy,309 Mass. 9,0. 34 N.E.2d 650 (1941); Diamond v. Diamond. 101 N.H. 338. 143A.2d 109 (1958); Rhoades v. Rhoades, 10 N.T. Super. 432, 77 A.2d 273 (1950);
Bryant v. Brvant. 171 N.C. 746, 88 S.E. 147 (1916); Tyminski v. Tyminski. 8Ohio Misc. 202, 221 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio C. P. 1966); Young v. Young. 127 S.W.898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910). See generally Annot., 15 A.L.R. 2d 706, 726-28(1951); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Annulment of Marriage § 41 (1962).
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had many elements analogous to a civil contract.0 After it was recog-
nized that a marriage induced by fraud was subject to annulment the
question arose as to what constituted sufficient fraud.7 While adopting
a more liberal policy than the English courts,8 the American courts did
follow England in limiting annulment to those forms of fraud which
went to the "essentials" of the marriage relation.9 However, courts
differed and still differ concerning what those "essentials" should be.
Although it is generally held that misrepresentations or concealment
as to fortune, rank, character or health will not constitute grounds for
annulment,10 exceptions are made in what the courts term "aggravated"
cases." It is clear that in cases where one of the parties entered the
marriage with an undisclosed intent not to consumate the marriage, or
to engage in normal relations, or to live with the other spouse, and
carried out this intention after the marriage, there is fraud going to
the essence of the marital relation sufficient to warrant an annulment' 2
It is also clear that concealment by the wife of her pregnancy by
another is grounds for annulment when the husband did not have
premarital relations with her.'3 Although the courts differ where there
have been premarital relations, the majority grant the annulment.14
6 "In a great many states marriage is defined simply as a 'civil contract"
Vaneman, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud, 9 MnN'. L. 11Ev. 499 (1925).7
" In some states the statutes mentioned 'fraud' as a ground for annulment or
divorce, without defining its intended scope, and in others there was no statutory
mention of it, but the presence or absence of such statutes has had little effect
upon the decisions." J. MADDEN, HANDBOOx OF THE LAW OF PmrsoNs AND
DomEsTuc RELATONS 14 (1931).8 For a general discussion and comparison of the English and American
treatment of annulment see Moore, supra note 1.
9H. C.AIM, LAw OF Dolvmssc RELATIONS 105 (1968); J. MADDEN, supra
note 7, at 13; 3 W. NELsoN, DrvoRcE AND A us mwmur § 31.30 (2d ed. 1945).
10 Barnes v. Barnes, 110 Cal. 418, 42 P. 904 (1895); Wesley v. Wesley, 181
Ky. 135, 204 S.W. 165 (1918); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605
(1862); Diamond v. Diamond, 101 N.H. 338, 143 A.2d 109 (1958); Jakar v.
Jakar, 113 S.C. 295, 102 S.E. 337 (1920); Rascop v. Rascop, 274 Wis. 254, 79
N.W.2d 828 (1956).
11 An annulment is usually granted where there has been a concealment or
misrepresentation as to veneral disease, impotence or sterility. Concealment of a
prior history of epilepsy, tuberculosis, or mental illness have generally been held
not to constitute grounds for annulment. The cases which have granted annulments
for fraudulent misrepresentations as to character or past life usually turned on the
materiality of the misrepresentation and the youth and inexperience of the
plaintiff. See H. CLAIM, supra note 9, at 111-114.
12Anders v. Anders, 224 Mass. 438, 113 N.E. 203 (1916); Zerk v. Zerk,
257 Wis. 555, 44 N.W.2d 568 (1950) (intent not to consumate the marriage);
Santos v. Santos, 80 R.I. 5, 90 A.2d 771 (1952) (intent not to engage in normal
relations); Feynman v. Feynman, 168 Misc. 210, 4 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1938)
(intent not to live with the other spouse).
13 A. C. v. B. C., 12 Misc. 2d 1. 176 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Hardesty
v. Hardesty. 193 Cal. 330. 223 P. 951 (1924).
14 Granting the annulment: Lyman v. Lyman, 90 Conn. 399, 97 A. 312
(1916); Arndt v. Arndt, 336 Ill. App. 65, 82 N.E.2d 908 (1948); Jackson v.
(Continued on next page)
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On the other hand, the majority of courts deny the annulment in those
cases where the husband was induced to marry by the wife's assertion
of pregnancy when, in fact, she was not pregnant.1 The basis for this
denial has usually been that as the parties are in pari delicto the wife's
action in inducing him to marry her could only be regarded as in-
ducing him to perform his social obligation. 1
In fact situations analogous to the instant case only two courts
have granted an annulment.17 The earliest case was Di Lorenzo v.
Di Lorenzo'18 where the New York court, treating marriage as a civil
contract, held that the dispositive issue was whether the fraud in-
ducing the consent of the plaintiff was of such a material nature as to
warrant an annulment.19 The court required that the fraud be
material to the degree that without it the plaintiff would not have
consented to the marriage, and that the artifice be such as to deceive
a reasonably prudent man.20 Thus the court applied a two-fold test:
1) the subjective test of whether the consent of the plaintiff was in
fact induced by this fraud,21 and 2) the objective test of whether a
reasonably prudent man would have been justified in relying on the
fraud. The court did not mention nor consider the pari delicto defense
or the majority requirement that the fraud go to the "essentials of the
marriage relation."
In the later case of Masters v. Masters,22 the Wisconsin court cited
Di Lorenzo with approval, emphasizing the importance of the sub-
jective criteria in determining whether there are grounds for annul-
ment.23 In refusing to apply the pari delicto defense, the Wisconsin
court pointed out that the punishment inflicted by denying an an-
nulment in cases of this kind was out of all proportion to the offense
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Ruby, 120 Me. 391, 115 A. 90 (1921); Card v. Gard, 204 Mich. 255, 169 N.W.
908 (1918); Zutavern v. Zutavern, 155 Neb. 395, 52 N.W.2d 254 (1952); Winner
v. Winner, 171 Wis. 413, 177 N.W. 680 (1920). Denying the annulment: Shat-
ford v. Shatford, 214 Ark. 612, 217 S.W.2d 917 (1949); Amo v. Arno, 265 Mass.
282, 163 N.E. 861 (1928); Safford v. Safford, 224 Mass. 392, 113 N.E. 181
(1916).
15See note 5 supra.
16 Mobley v. Mobley, 245 Ala. 90, 16 So.2d 5 (1943); Brandt v. Brandt, 123
Fla. 680, 167 So. 524 (1936).
17Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903); Masters v.
Masters, 13 Wis.2d 332, 108 N.W.2d 674 (1961).
18 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63 (1903).
19 Id. at -, 67 N.E. at 63.
20 Id. at -, 67 N.E. at 65.
21 If the consent of the plaintiff was induced by the fraud then there was no
consent; consent was negatived by the fraud.
22 13 Wis. 2d 332, 108 N.W.2d 674 (1961).
23 "[C ourts should be hesitant to annul marriages on the ground of fraud
perpetrated upon one of the parties by the other, unless thoroughly convinced
that the defrauded party would not have entered into the marriage contract except
for such fraud." Id. at -, 108 N.W.2d at 679.
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committed. It noted further that to refuse an annulment would be to
punish the plaintiff not for his illicit intercourse, but rather for his
laudable conduct in attempting to right the wrong he believed would
result if he did not marry the defendant. The court rejected the
deterrence argument concluding that if the current civil, criminal and
social pressures were not sufficient to deter such conduct it was un-
likely that denying an annulment would be any more effective. On
the other hand, the court felt that by denying an annulment it would
be rewarding the defendant for fraud and punishing the plaintiff for
attempting to right a wrong.
In the instant case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that
the reasoning of the majority of courts in denying an annulment in
like cases involved a mixture of two concepts, one being that when a
single man engages in sexual intercourse with a single woman he has
a social obligation to marry her, and the other being that since the
man engaging in illicit intercourse is in pari delicto, he may not
complain to the courts of any resulting misconduct of the woman. In
rejecting the social obligation theory the Court held that since it was
not a basis for affirmative relief it should not furnish a justification for
fraud. In refusing to apply the principle of in pari delicto the Court
cited and adopted the reasoning of the Wisconsin court in the Masters
case.24 The Court also cited authority25 for the proposition that in
determining whether a defense bars recovery "the courts should weigh
the substance of the right asserted by the plaintiff against the trans-
gression claimed to foreclose it."26
With this decision Kentucky joined New York and Wisconsin in
rejecting the "essentials of the marriage" test, and the concepts of
"social obligation to marry" and in pari delicto as essential consid-
erations in determining whether a marriage should be annulled for
fraud. It seems clear that the Court's analysis, reasoning and ap-
plication of law27 were sufficient to justify and uphold its decision.
The only question remaining is whether considerations of public
policy warranted a different result. The one-man dissent in Parks
seems to sum up and embody the underlying essence of the majority
position: "To allow an annulment upon the facts in the instant case
would open up a new field for people inclined to throw off the relation
and responsibility of a sacred contract upon which the basis of our
society rests."28 In other words, the dissent is saying that marriage is
24 418 S.W.2d at 727.
2527 Am. JuR. 2d Equity § 141 (1966).
26 418 S.W.2d at 727.27 KRS § 402.030 authorizes courts having general equity jurisdiction to
"declare void any marriage obtained by ...fraud. ...
28 418 S.W.2d at 729.
[Vol. 57,
CONMENrs
more than a civil contract, it is an institution, the social importance of
which is evidenced by the existence of state laws to govern its in-
ception and dissolution. Thus in order to protect the institution of
marriage the majority of courts would have denied the annulment.
However, it should be obvious that greater protection of the institution
resulted from the Court's decision granting the annulment. The
institution of marriage. This is also true of annulment statutes applied
nulment in a case like Parks where the marriage has almost no
chance of success and would not have taken place but for the fraud
of the defendant. Fraud has no place in either a "civil" or "sacred"
contract. Every state in the union has enacted divorce laws intended to
reflect, satisfy and secure society's demand for the protection of the
institution of marriage. This is also true of annulment statutes applied
by the courts when, because of considerations of policy, equity and
justice, they are the more appropriate remedy. Because society loses
by perpetuating marriages under the circumstances of the Parks case,
the annulment was properly granted.
It is impossible to determine what the significance and impact of
this decision will be. However, it is nonetheless significant and may
well indicate that a change in society's view and attitude toward mar-
riage is beginning to be reflected in court decisions. Hopefully this
decision does indicate the beginning of a trend because it seems to
evidence a more enlightened, realistic and humanitarian view of
marriage in which there is not only concern for the protection and
welfare of the institution but also for the individuals involved. This
view not only recognizes the individual's and society's interest in the
marital relationship but also their interest that the relationship be
happy and successful. Thus, while it may still be necessary in a
particular case to protect and defend the institution at the expense of
the individuals involved, their interests should be an important con-
sideration in every decision.
Andrew M. Winkler
TORTS-NELIGENCE-NEGLiGENCE PER SE AS PROXIMATE CAUSE OF IN-
juRy iN "FALL-DowN" CAsEs.-Herbert R. Franklin was injured when
he lost his footing and fell down a flight of stairs in a building, part
of which was leased by Blue Grass Restaurant Co., Inc. The stairway
was not equipped with handrails as required by a Lexington city
ordinance. Franklin failed to testify as to what caused him to slip,
but he did state that as he started to fall he threw out his arms in an
1969]
